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I. THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP
A.

STATEMENT

The very foundation for legal malpractice is the relationship
created between an attorney and another party. If there is no
relationship, there can be no responsibility running from one to the
other. If, however, a relationship has been created, this relationship
dictates the various responsibilities, and, in some cases, the
liabilities of attorneys.
Whether or not a relationship exists between an attorney and
client is very seldom, if ever, the question in a malpractice case. Its
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existence has already been presumed or assumed as a result of the
bringing of the action by the aggrieved party. This is not to say that
in an appropriate case it could not be raised as a defense to show
that no duty existed and, therefore, no liability could attach. But
while the existence of a relationship between an attorney and client
is seldom a point of argument in a case, the time of initiation of the
attorney-client relationship is frequently a point of contention,
sometimes bearing upon privileged communications and at other
times upon deadlines that may not have been met.
B. How is

IT CREATED.

In cases dealing with this matter, it has frequently been held
that the relationship between an attorney and a client begins when
a person approaches an attorney with the intention of retaining his
services. This initial investigation by the client with the view in
mind of retaining the attorney's services is sufficient to protect
privileged communications. 1
Following initial client contacts, an attorney may be called to
task for failing to meet certain deadlines which he did not know that
he had. In Herston v. Whitesell, 2 the plaintiff brought suit against a
law firm for allowing the statute of limitations to run on a personalinjury action. The attorneys claimed that there was no attorneyclient relationship, and thus, no cause of action existed. The client
claimed the attorneys had assured him that he had an excellent
case, had dissuaded him from seeking a settlement, and had sent
him to a doctor for diagnosis. In reversing a summary judgment for
the attorneys, the supreme court held that the question of the
existence of a relationship between the parties was to be decided by
the jury. s
C. How IS

IT TERMINATED?

1. The Relationship re: Client
Certainly an attorney-client relationship can be terminated
when the client specifically advises the attorney that his services are
no longer necessary. Surprisingly, this is not a frequent occurrence.
More often, the relationship is self-terminating when the purpose
i. Tavlor v. Sheldon, 172 Ohio St. 118, 173 N.E.2d 892 (1961).
2. 348 So. 2d 1054 (Ala. 1977).
3. Herston v. Whitesell. 348 So. 2d 1054, 1057 (Ala. 1977).
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of the attorney's employment has been accomplished by the
attorney, and the client has been advised of the accomplishment.
The case of Ohlman v. Ohlman4 involved an attempt to modify a
divorce decree. The plaintiff's attorney served a motion on the
husband's original attorney, who advised him that he no longer
represented the husband. The wife's attorney proceeded with the
motion, which was granted. In reversing the decision the court held
that the purpose for which the husband's attorney had been hired
was accomplished. 5 Therefore, service upon him was not imputed
to the client.
It is no part of logic that, because a court retains
jurisdiction over the subject matter of litigation, an
attorney who has concluded his professional obligation in
the proceedings, and who has been paid... has the status
of an "attorney of record" for the balance of his
professional career. When ajudgment of divorce has been
entered, the litigation as far as the attorney is concerned is
6
concluded .
In those instances in which an attorney has been advised by a
client of his termination, it is well to remember that it is not
necessary that a client have any reason -for the discharge of his
attorney. 7 While an attorney may request the reason for the
discharge, it is not recognized as being the basis for anything other
than perhaps friendly conversation. An attorney is a servant of a
master who has employed him. The master may supervise,
supersede, or direct his actions so long as the attorney is in the
employ of the client.
The power of the client to control the case can be seen in Baker
v. Zikas. 8 The attorney was hired on a contingent fee basis to
prosecute the client's cause of action. The client became dissatisfied
with the progress of the case and dismissed the attorney. The court
held that the client had the power to terminate the attorney-client
relationship and that the attorney was limited to recovering only for
services rendered. 9 This was so despite the fact that a successful
completion of the contract would have presented the attorney with
a much higher fee.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

49 Mich. App. 366, 212 N.W.2d 75 (1973).
Ohlmanv. OhIman. 49 Mich. App. 366. 212 N.W.2d 75 (1973).
Id. at __
212 N.W.2d at 77-78.
Gentrvv. Richardson, 228 Ark. 677. 309 S.W.2d 721 (1958).
176 Neb. 290. 125 N.%V.2d 715 (1964).
Bakery . Zikas. 176 Neb. 290. __
125 NAV.2d 715. 717 (1964).
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This employment does not, however, create a situation in
which the attorney is required to perform any unethical and/or
unlawful services on behalf of a client. The ethical and legal
requirements of an attorney's conduct do not require him to go
beyond the bounds of ethical practice. If a client insists on pursuing
a course which the attorney knows is unethical, the attorney may
withdraw from representation of the client, or, in an appropriate
case, obtain permission to withdraw and inform the appropriate
court of his reasons. This situation arises frequently in criminal
cases. It can be as simple as a frivolous appeal, 10 or it can be
serious, such as perjury." In any event, the attorney cannot be
required to and should not become involved in any wrongful
conduct. In Carr v. Florida,12 the court noted the following: "[An
attorney's] duty does not include, and his Code of Ethics prohibits,
his setting up false claims to enable him to win his client's cause. "I'3
And in North Carolina v. Robinson, 14 the court stated as follows:
"Clearly the client has no right to insist that counsel assist him by
presenting in evidence testimony which counsel knows, or
reasonably believes, constitutes perjury."15
It is further recognized that neither a court order nor any other
documentary execution is required to perfect a discharge of an
attorney by a client. Any act andor statement of a client indicating
a purpose to sever the relationship between the attorney and client
is sufficient to bring about a cessation of the relationship between
the parties. In the case of Thomas v. Thomas, 16 the attorneys for the
wife sought a modification of a divorce decree. Her husband had
dismissed his attorneys. Despite being so informed, the wife's
attorneys served upon the discharged attorney her motion. The
justification of service was based upon the fact that there had been
no court action taken to effect the discharge of his attorney. In
dismissing this claim, the court noted that "[n]o special formality is
required to effect the discharge of the attorney and the termination
of the relationship; any act of the client indicating an unmistakable
purpose to sever relations is enough ... .
Once the discharge of an attorney has taken place, an attorney
is neither honor nor duty bound to any longer protect ancdor
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Carr v. Florida, 180 So. 2d381 (Fla. App. 1965).
State v. Robinson, 290 N.C. 56, 224S.E.2d 174(1976).
180 So. 2d 381 (Fla. App. 1965).
Id. at 382.
290 N.C. 56, 224 S.E.2d 174(1976).
Id. at - , 224 S.E.2d at 179.
178 Misc. 349, 34 N.Y.S.2d 320 (1942).
Thomas v. Thomas, 178 Misc. 349, __
, 34 N.Y.S.2d 320, 323 (1942).
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represent the interests of the person who discharged him.1 8 There
may be an exception as to the continuing obligations not to act
contrary to the client while utilizing information received as an
attorney for the client, nor to act adversely to the interests of the
former client while using information gained in any confidential
relationship. 19 Good practice ordinarily dictates, however, under
the circumstances of discharge, that an attorney write the client a
letter acknowledging the discharge, thus setting a definite time
when no further action will be performed.
2. The Relationship re: Adverse Parties
The attorney-client relationship may be severed completely at
any time by the client. If there have arisen other relationships
between the attorney and others, such as the court ancdor adverse
parties, these collateral relationships are not necessarily dissolved at
the same time as the relationship between the attorney and the
client. This was demonstrated in Atwood v. Atwood, 20 in which
it was held that the attorney-client relationship continued
after final judgment in a divorce case, since the court retained
jurisidction of the subject matter. Thus a motion for modification
served on the husband's former attorney constituted service upon
the husband, even though the attorney informed all parties that he
was no longer representing his client. 21
3. The Relationship re: the Court
When an attorney-client relationship has created a collateral
relationship between the attorney and the court, the severance of
the attorney-client relationship will not ordinarily at the same time
dissolve the relationship between the attorney and the court. This is
necessary to protect the rights, duties, and obligations of the courts,
as well as the rights, duties, and obligations of adverse parties
which might be affected by the disappearance of the attorney from
an attorney-court relationship. In United States v. Curry,22 the United
States Supreme Court held that "[w]hile the [attorney's] name
continues there [in the record], the adverse party has a right to treat
18. Hunt v. Kolken, 49 App. Div. 2d 747, 372 N.Y.S.2d 698 (1975).
19. Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568 (2d Cir. 1975).
20. 253 Minn. 185, 91 N. X.2d 728 (1958).
21. Atwood v. Atwood. 235 Minn. 185.
-, 91 N.XV.2d 728. 736 (1958). Contra. Ohiman v.
Ohlman. 49 Mich. App. 366. 212 N.W.2d 75 (1973). Thomas \. Thomas. 178 Misc. 349. 34
N.Y.S. 2d 320 (1942).
22.47 U.S. (6 How.) 106(1848).
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him as the authorized attorney or solicitor, and the service of notice
upon him is as valid as if served on the party himself. "23 Therefore,
steps in addition to the dissolution of the immediate attorney-client
relationship, may be necessary for an attorney to sever himself from
the obligations owed to the court, which were collaterally created
by the formation of an attorney-client relationship.
D.

CONTRACTS, EXPRESS AND IMPLIED

The attorney-client relationship ordinarily is a relationship
founded upon contract. In most cases, it is founded upon the basis
of an express contract, as where a client has expressly employed an
attorney to represent him in some specific instance or in a general
way. These express contracts are sometimes formal and written.
More often they are merely verbal and sometimes most general in
character. In these express instances the existence of the
relationship is seldom ever in doubt. However, while contracts may
be created expressly between parties, likewise, such relationship
may be created in an implied manner. This may be implied from
the conduct of the parties with relationship to each other. 24 In this
connection, it is considered the better practice after an initial
interview of a potential client, to forward a letter to the client
outlining specifically what was agreed upon, or not agreed upon.
Disputes may arise as to whether or not a conversation gave
rise to an attorney-client relationship. 25 Disputes may also arise in
determining what was agreed upon after the relationship was
established. In Bresette v. Knapp26 an attorney's landlord consulted
him about a personal accident. He was dissatisfied with an offer
from the insurance company and asked the attorney to help. The
attorney secured a substantial increase in the settlement offer but
the client refused it. The attorney believed that he had
accomplished his duty and took no further action. The client
believed that the attorney was undertaking to pursue the matter
through institution of a lawsuit. The claim subsequently became
barred by the statute of limitations. Upon trial, the jury found for
the attorney. A simple letter to the client setting out the attorney's
understanding of his employment would have prevented the entire
problem.
23. United States v. Curry, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 106, 111(1848).
24. Healv v. Gray. 184 Iowa 111. 168 N.W. 222. 224 (1918): Prigmore %. Hardware Mutual
Ins. Co. ofMinn.. 225 S.W,2d 897, 899 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
25. Seee. g.,Herston v. Whitesell. 348 So. 2d 1054 (Ala. 1977).
26. 121 Vt. 376. 159A.2d 329 (1960).
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E. Is

PAYMENT ESSENTIAL?

The relationship of an attorney and client being ordinarily one
of contract, one might presume that the full requisites of contract
law would be applicable. This is not necessarily so. The defense of
failure of consideration in a contract action is not always available
in a malpractice action. Most attorneys are aware of instances in
which attorneys' services have been performed gratuitously. In
some instances this gratuitous rendition was only discovered after
payment for services was sought. Yet in many instances legal
services have been rendered gratuitously from their beginning. In
either case of non-payment there would never be a question that the
services should have been performed in a competent manner and
that an attorney-client relationship existed.
In Fort Meyers Seafood Packers, Inc. v. Steptoe &Johnson,27 a client
of the attorneys had requested them to draw a contract which
involved the plaintiff's fishing boats conducting operations in
Venezuelan waters. The contract stated that no changes in the
registry of the boats were contemplated. The boats were later
impounded for Venezuelan registry violations. The plaintiffs sued
the attorneys for failure to determine that a different registration
was required. The court, reversing a summary judgment for the
attorneys, held that the fact that the plaintiffs were not obligated to
pay the defendant attorneys did not preclude the existence of an
28
attorney-client relationship.
F.

FIDUCIARY AND CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONS

The fiduciary relationship which an attorney owes to his client
has been described as follows: "[It is] pre-eminently confidential. It
demands on the part of the attorney undivided allegiance, a
conspicuous degree of faithfulness and disinterestedness, absolute
integrity and utter renunciation of every personal advantage
conflicting in any way directly or indirectly with the interests of his
client. ''29
Every precaution must be taken to avoid overreaching, and, in
the event of conflict, the attorney who occupies the superior
position must yield. In Healy v. Gray, 30 the court, citing Singo v.
27. 381 F.2d 261 (D.C. Cir. 1967). cert.
denied. 390 U.S. 946 (1968).
28. Fort Meyers Seafood Packers. Inc. v. Steptoe & Johnson, 381 F.2d 261. 262 (D.C. Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 946 (1968).
29. State Bar Ass'n. of Conn. %. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co.. 145 Conn. 222. _,
140
A.2d 863. 870 (1958).
30. 184 Iowa 111. 168 N.XV. 222 (1918).
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Brainard,31 stated as follows:
[Als a sound and salutary legal principle, that so long as
the relationship of client and attorney exists, the attorney
is a trustee for his client in and about the cause of the
subject thereof, and any trade that he makes or benefits
he may derive resulting from the litigation. . . will inure
to the benefit of the client... [I]t would be difficult to find
an authority in any jursidiction of respectable standing
holding to the contrary.31
This area of the law regarding attorneys' and clients'
relationships will undoubtedly continue to be enforced with vigor.
If the legal profession is to remain a vigorous profession, it must
assume the responsibility for representing clients in all good faith,
with the resolution of all conflicts being against the profession.
Only by readily taking and accepting this responsibility can the
status of the profession be enhanced and the public trust of the
profession increased.
The logical basis for this relationship, of course, is founded
upon the fact that clients should be able to entrust completely their
innermost secrets to an attorney without fear that such confidences
will later come to haunt them. "[A] client does not assume any risk
in communicating freely with his attorneys concerning the subjectmatter of the employment. '33 This sets the bounds for the
confidential relationship. The fiduciary relationship, while closely
related to confidentiality, measures the degree of commitment that
the attorney has to the client. A fiduciary relationship calls for the
conduct of the attorney to be above the marketplace. It requires all
transactions between an attorney and a client to be able to be
subjected to the closest scrutiny without the discovery of anything
34
but the exercise of highest honor.

G. PRINICPAL

AND AGENCY OF ATTORNEYS

It has previously been seen that an attorney and client may
have several relationships with each other, i.e., in contract, as
employer-employee, as well as one of a fiduciary. They may also
31. 173Ala. 64, 555 So. 603 (1911).
32. Healy v. Gray, 184 Iowa 111,
, 168 N. W. 222,225(1918).
33. Id. at - , 168 N.W.at 225 (emphasis added).
34. Palfy v.Rice, 473 P.2d 606 (Alaska 1970).
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have the relationship of principal and agent. The word "attorney"
comes from the Latin "attornare," which literally means "to
appoint a substitute." This word also has a root from the word
"attorn," which literally means "to turn over." Thus in Nardi v.
Poinsatte,35 the court recognized that an attorney is an agent or a
substitute who has been appointed and authorized to act in place or
in the stead of another. It has also been held that a lawyer and an
attorney are synonymous. 36 In general, the same rules which
govern the field of law of agency will apply between attorneys and
clients. However, the attorney owes a higher duty in the attorneyclient relationship; 37 the fiduciary status occupied by the attorney
will place his conduct above that ordinarily expected in the
marketplace. 38 Furthermore, since an attorney is an officer of the
court, he has a quasi-public capacity. In Curtis v. Richards,39 it was
held that an attorney is more than an agent.
It is further contended that the attorney is simply the
agent of his client. To a certain extent this is true; but he
-is more than an agent. He is also an officer of the court,
and within his sphere and in the line of his special powers
he is as independent as the judge of the court, and has not
only his duties and obligations to the court and to his
client, but he has rights and powers entirely different
from and superior to an ordinary agent. An agent
receives his orders from, and is directed absolutely and
wholly by, his principal, in the management of his
business. On the other hand, the business of the client
which is submitted to his attorney is managed entirely by
the attorney, and the client is advised and directed by
him. As to the business committed to his care, the
attorney is the sole manager and director. Hence his
responsibilities are much greater than those of an
40
ordinary agent.
The quasi-public capacity held by the attorney, giving him
additional privileges, also gives him additional duties. In Hoppe v.
Klapperich,4 1 the court spoke with regard to this public duty.
35.46 F.2d 347, 348(D.Ind. 1931).
36. People v. Taylor. 56 Colo. 441.
138 P. 762.763 (1914).
37. Cattle Farms. Inc., v.Abercrombie, 211 So. 2d 354. 365 (La. App, 1968).
38. Arev v, Davis. 233 Ga. 951. 213 S.E.2d 837 (1975).
39.41 Idaho 434.40 P. 57 (1895).
40 Curtis v. Richards, 41 Idaho 434. _
.40 P. 57. 58 (1895).
41. 224 N"inn, 224.28 N.\V.2d 780 (1947).
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In every case that comes to him in his professional
capacity, he must determine wherein lies his obligations
to the public and his obligations to his client, and to
discharge this duty properly requires the exercise of a
keen discrimination, and wherever -the duties to his client
conflict with those he owes to the public as an officer of the court in
the administrationofjustice, the former must yield to the latter...
The attorney, then, cannot always justify himself under
the instructions of his client, no matter how positive they
42
may be.
II. STANDARD OF CARE REQUIREMENTS
A.

STATEMENT

That degree of care that society and the courts demand from
the legal profession is the standard used to measure the conduct of
an attorney. When a controversy arises, the application of the
standard requires a certain minimal level of performance,
performance below which is not permissible. This standard of care
is composed of two items, one being care, the other, skill. Care has
to do with the diligence the attorney must exercise. Skill has to do
with the level of performance and knowledge which the attorney
must exercise in carrying out his obligations to his client. 4 3 Some
writers contend that an additional element to be included in the
standard is "good faith."
One writer has stated that "[dliligence and good faith often
are mentioned by courts as elements negating an unfavorable
result. Good faith performance below the standard is not a barrier
to a malpractice recovery, but the lack of good faith occasionally
substantiates malpractice allegations. , , 4 The ,United States
Supreme Court spoke of the standard in 1879 when, in the case of
Savings Bank v. Ward,4 5 the court stated the following:
When a person adopts the legal profession, and assumes
to exercise its duties in behalf of another for hire, he must
be understood as promising to employ a reasonable
degree of care and skill in the performance of such duties;
and if injury results to the client from a want of such a
42. Hoppev. Klapperich, 224 Minn. 224.
.28 N.W.2d 780, 791-92 (1947).
43. See Wade. TheAttorney's LiabiliyforNegligence, 12 VAND. L. REv. 755, 762 (1959).
44. Gillen. Legal Malpractice, 12 WASHBURN L. J. 281. 288 (1973), citing Strauss v. New
Amsterdam Cas. Co.. 30 Misc.2d 345, 216 N. Y. S.2d 861 (N. Y. City Mun. Ct. 1961).
45. 100 U.S. 195(1879).
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degree of reasonable care and skill, the attorney may be
held to respond in damages to the extent of the injury
46
sustained.
It should be noted that an attorney is not an insurer of a good
result. Nor is he an insurer of his opinions. Application of the
standard of care to an attorney's conduct does not require perfect
results. A non-negligent mistake or error in judgment in an area
which is subject to dispute does not create liability. The Ward court
noted that "it must not be understood that an attorney is liable for
every mistake that may occur in practice, or that he may be held
responsible to his client for every error of judgment in the conduct
of his client's cause. " 47
By definition, reasonable skill does not mean that the highest
degree of skill and care must be exercised. There is a median or
ordinary skill that must be used. In Hodges v. Carter,4 8 skill was
defined as "the requisite degree of learning, skill, and ability
necessary to the practice of his profession and which others
similarly situated ordinarily possess; ...he will exert his best
49
judgment in the prosecution of the litigation entrusted to him;
Quoting from the Hodges case, the court, in Cook v. Irion,5 0 added
that an attorney "is thus subject to the same general rules of law as
are physicians, dentists, and other professional people.' '51
Some writers note a difference in the application of the
medical and legal standards of care. 52 All seem to agree a standard
must be used, but there is disagreement as to what the model is to
be for the objective standard in the community. One standard
would require an attorney to use that degree of skill and care
ordinarily possessed by well-informed members of the profession. 5 3
In cases arising from California and Texas, standards seem to have
been approved that an attorney must use such skill, prudence, and
diligence as lawyers of ordinary skill and capacity commonly possess
and exercise. 54 Writers in this area have leveled the standard, and
have stated it to be as follows: "An attorney's liability for
malpractice is based on the theory that the average lawyer would
'".

46. Savings Bank v.Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 198(1879).
47. Id.
48. 239 N.C. 517, 80 S.E.2d 144(1954).
49. Hodges v. Carter, 239 N.C. 517, -, 80 S.E.2d 144, 145-46 (1954).
50. 409 S.W.2d 475 (Tex. Civ. App, 1966).
51. Cook v. Irion, 409 S.W.2d 475, 477 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
52. Note, Standard ofCare in LegalMalpractice,43 IND. L.J. 771 (1968).
53. Citizens Loan, Fund & Savings Ass'n. v. Friedley, 123 Ind. 143, 23 N.E. 1075 (1890).
54. Smith v. Lewis, 530 P.2d 589, 118 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1975); Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal.2d 583,
364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961, cert.
denied, 368 U. S. 987 (1962); Cook v. Irion, 409 S.W.2d
475 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
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not have acted in the same manner as the defendant in the same
circumstances; therefore, the conduct of the average attorney is of
crucial importance. 55
B.

LOCALITY CONSIDERATIONS

As opposed to the "medical locality rule" in medical
malpractice cases, the adoption of the "legal locality rule" was
never universally accepted in the cases of attorneys' malpractice
and little headway has been made with establishing such a locality
rule in attorneys' malpractice cases. 56 In a Fifth Circuit case, for
example, an attorney was held liable for having violated the
standard of care, even though it was admitted that he had followed
the usual customary local rule of practice. 57 If any locality rule can
be considered to have been established, it will be upon a
determination originating from the local jurisdiction of the court or
the jurisdiction of the state. 58 The Supreme Court of Washington
has adopted a statewide standard, specifically rejecting the more
restrictive locality rule.
The standards of practice for lawyers in this jurisdiction
as a qualification for the practice of law are the same
throughout the state, and do not differ in its various
communities. We therefore hold that the correct standard
to which the plaintiff is held in the performance of his
professional services is that degree of care, skill, diligence
and knowledge commonly possessed and exercised by a
reasonable, careful and prudent lawyer in the practice of
law in this jurisdiction. 59
While the locality considerations might not be used as an
escape from liability, locality considerations might be utilized in
deciding whether or not to admit expert testimony. In a retreat
from the expanding scope of responsibility and liability, the Texas
court, in Cook v. Irion, 60 commented on an out-of-county attorney
giving an opinion that the defendant did not meet the standard of
care for a Texas attorney. The court stated as follows:
55. Note. Attornej,.,alpractice. 63 Co Lui L. R . 1292. 1'.06 (1963).
56. Id. at 1304: Note, supra note 52, at 781.
57. Gleason v. Title Guar. Co.. 300 F.2d 813 (5th Cir. 1962).
58. See Smith v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 471 F.2d 840 (5th Cir. 1972).
59. Cook, Flanagan. & Berst v. Clausing, 73 Wash. 2d 393.
-, 438 P.2d 865, 866-67 (1968).
60. 409 S.W.2d 475 (Tex. Cir. App. 1966).
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Furthermore, an attorney practicing in a vastly different
locality would not be qualified to second-guess the
judgment of an experienced attorney of the El Paso
County Bar .... The importance of knowledge of the local
situation is fully demonstrated by the well-recognized
practice among lawyers of this state in associating local
61
counsel in the trial of most important jury cases.
While some writers have opted for the extension of the
"locality rule,' '62 this has not been the general trend.

C.

THE ELEMENTS OF THE STANDARD

1. Skill
a. Skills, Objective and Subjective
If a subjective standard of skill were ever used in a case of
establishing liability, proof of perjury would often be necessary in
order to allow the plaintiff to recover. Therefore, the objective
standard is applied with regard to attorneys, as it is to all other
professional people. In Sohn v. Bernstein,63 it was held that such an
objective standard required an attorney "to use such skill,
prudence, and diligence as lawyers of ordinary skill and capacity
commonly possess and exercise in the performance of the tasks
which they undertake".... ,64
The objective standard requires an attorney to know those
rules of law generally recognized and established by statutes,
treatises, and case law, and to be able to handle and deal with them
correctly. 65 One court has stated that the diligence required of an
attorney is such as a man of ordinary prudence gives to his own
business. 66 A decision made in an area of confusion, however, if
made in good faith, will probably not result in an attorney being
67
held responsible.
61. Id. at 478.
62. Gillen. supra note 44.
63. 279 A.2d 529 (Me. 1971).
64. Sohn v. Bernstein, 279 A.2d 529. 532 (Me. 1971).
65. Citizens Loan. Fund & Savings Ass'n. v. Friedley. 123 Ind. 143. 23 N.E. 1075 (1890):
Note. Supra note 55. at 1294-95.
66. \Villiarns v. Knox. 10 N.J. Super. 384.76 A.2d 712 (1950).
67. Hill v. *I,'natt. 59 S.\V. 163 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1900): Haughev, Lawvers'Afalpractice:A Comparativ "Appraisal. 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 888 (1973): Note. Supra note 52: Annot.. 45 A.L.R.2d 5
(1956).
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b. Specialists
There are not many cases holding attorneys engaged in
specialized practices to a higher standard of care than that standard
which governs attorneys in general. This is thought due to the fact
that specialization of attorneys is of relative recent vintage. It may
also speak to the fact that those who specialize in certain areas have
been extremely competent. The rule of reason would direct us,
however, to assume that if one holds himself out to be a specialist,
that his knowledge should have to be superior to that of an ordinary
practitioner who does not specialize. In Wright v. Williams,6 8 a
California court held specialists did have a different standard.
One who holds himself out as a legal specialist performs in
similar circumstances to other specialists but not to
general practitioners of the law. We thus conclude that a
lawyer holding himself out to the public and the
profession as specializing in an area of the law must
exercise the skill, prudence, and diligence exercised by
other specialists of ordinary skill and capacity specializing
69
in the same field.
In Childs v. Comstock, 70 the court sustained the liability of attorneys in a specialized area. It took into account the fact that they
were recognized experts in a very specific area and had the
reputation for representing numerous litigants in the specialized
area. They were, thus, charged with having more significant
knowledge and appreciation for the risks involved. The court in
Patterson & Wallace v. Frazier,71 held that an attorney would be liable
if he failed to exercise the skill and care of an attorney "of ordinary
skill and capacity, versed in the particular practice of the particular
... [subject]. ,,, 2
2. Care
a. Standardin Court
Many cases have treated the question concerning an at68. 47 Cal. App. 3d 802. 121 Cal. Rptr. 194(1975).
69. \Vright v. Williams. 47 Cal. App. 3d 802, 810, 121 Cal. Rptr. 194, 199 (1975).
70. 69 App. DiN. 160. 74 N.Y.S. 643 (1902).
71. 79 S.W. 1077 (Tcx. Cir. App. 1904).
72. t'attersn & XVallacc . Frazier. 79 S.W. 1077. 1080 (Tex. Cir. App. 1904). See alo. Note.
,fpra noc 55. at 13)2: ol/r nT 52 at 785.
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torney's conduct as a question of fact to be determined by a jury.
This would appear to be the majority rule, as in the case of Rhine v.
Haley. 73 The conduct in question involved an attorney's lack of action in enforcing and collecting a property settlement. The husband
had absconded to Louisiana with all of the property. The court held
the reasonableness of the attorney's conduct in failing to collect the
settlement or to place a lien on the property was a determination to
74
be made by the jury, as a question of fact.
b. Questions of Law and Fact
There is, however, a body of case law which indicates that under certain circumstances the conduct of the attorney is not to be
measured against the objective definition of "fact," but determined as a matter of law. 75 These cases appear to be concerned
with facts that are undisputed and of such a nature as to represent
grossly deficient conduct. Therefore, the courts seem duty bound to
hold the attorney's conduct is to be measured as a matter of law. In
instances where there may be some difficulty or confusion about the
proper application of the law, the courts properly treat it as a
question of fact; the facts to be determined by an examination of
the exercise of skill and care of the attorney in winnowing his way
through the clouds of confusion in making his decisions. While
there are cases going both ways, they do not appear to be in disharmony. A recognition of the types of cases and the facts from which
they arose will show that both avenues are justifiable under the circumstances of the cases. For instance, an attorney has been held
negligent as a matter of law in failing to inform his client that he
was terminating the attorney-client relationship, thus causing a
default judgment to be entered against the client. 76 As noted in Shon
v. Bernstein, 17 the misinterpretation of the cause of action and the
subsequent failure to meet the required statute of limitations was
stipulated by the parties to be negligence as a matter of law.
On the other hand, where the attorney is faced with a complicated field of law or intricate strategy, his actions are to be
judged by the jury as questions of fact. 78 Lucas v. HamM79 involved a
devise in a will which violated the rule against perpetuities. The
73. 238 Ark. 72. 378 S.W.2d 655 (1964).
74. Rhine %. Haley, 238 Ark. 72.
. 378 S.W.2d 655, 658 (1964).
75. Lvsick v. \Walcom. 258 Cal. App. 2d 136. 65 Cal. Rptr. 406 (1968): Sohn v. Bernstein. 279
A.2d 529 (Me. 1971).
76. Central Cab Co. v. Clarke, 259 Md. 542, 270 A.2d 662 (1970).
77. 279 A.2d 529 (Me. 1971).
78. Lucas v. Hamm. 56 Cal. 2d 583. 364 P.2d 685. 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 987 (1962): Suritz v. Kelner, 155 So. 2d 831 (Fla. App. 1963).
79. 56 Cal. 2d 583. 364 P.2d 685. l Cai. Rpr. 821 (1961), cert. aenzea, 368 u.S. 987 (1 62).
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court recognized that some actions of attorneys are negligent as a
matter of law, but held that this particular area was too complicated
and confused to apply such a strict standard to the drawer of the
will. 80 Suritz v. Kelner8 ' involved pre-trial strategy. The defendant
told his client not to answer interrogatories, apparently hoping for a
dismissal and a refiling under better circumstances. Unfortunately,
the judge dismissed with prejudice. The propriety of the attorney's
strategy-motivated advice was held to be a fact question for the
82
jury.
c. Expert Testimony
It has been held in some cases that the use of expert testimony
is not required to prove that an attorney has failed to meet the
proper standard of care. 3 It is felt, however, that in cases which are
highly complicated and where the standard could only be defined
by the application of knowledgeable people, the utilization of ex84
perts would be required.
There would not appear to be anything novel here when comparing these decisions with those involving medical malpractice. In
instances where laymen's knowledge is as expert as that of a doctor,
such as the leaving of a surgical sponge inside the patient, no expert
testimony would be required to establish the standard of care.a5 On
the other hand, in the highly complex area of corneal transplant
operations, and areas involving close calls of judgment, however,
expert testimony would be required and probably could not be
6
disregarded.
There does not appear to be any conflict in these decisions.
There are really two different rules to be applied to two different
types of cases. In cases where a layman is as knowledgeable as an
attorney, for example, in instances where the statute of limitations
is allowed to run, no one could say that expert testimony would be
required.8 7 But in cases of a highly complex nature involving unsettled questions of law in a highly technical area, where every
80. 56 Cal. 2d at __, 364 P.2d at 690, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 826.
81. 155 So. 2d831 (Fla. App. 1963).
82. Id. at 834.
83. House v. Maddox, 46 Ill. App. 3d 68, 4 Ill. Dec. 644, 360 N.E.2d 580 (1977); Watkins v.
Sheppard, 278 So. 2d 890 (La. App. 1973).
84. Starr v. Mooslin, 14 Cal. App. 3d 988, 92 Cal. Rptr. 583 (1971); Lysick v.. Walcom, 258
Cal. App. 2d 136, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406 (1968); Berman v. Rubin, 138 Ga. App. 849, 227 S.E.2d 802
(1976): Brown v. Gitlin. 19 Ill. App. 3d 1018, 313 N.E.2d 180 (1974).
85. Hestbeck v. Hennepin County, 297 Minn. 419. 212 N.W.2d 361 (1973).
86. McDermott v. Manhattan Eye, Ear. & Throat Hosp., 15 N.Y.2d 20. 255 N.Y.S.2d 65
(1964).
87. House x. Maddox, 461N. App. 3d 68. 4 Ill. Dec. 644,360 N.E.2d 580 (1977).

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

decision is subject to evaluation, it would appear as though expert
testimony would be necessary, and probably a prima facie case
could not be made without it. 88

III. THEORIES OF LIABILITY
A.

STATEMENT

The forms of action have all but disappeared from the legal
practice in the United States. They have been replaced with
theories of action which contain necessary elements, just as the
forms of action formerly did. It is sometimes necessary to
determine the basis upon which an attorney may be found liable in
a malpractice action, whether in contract or tort, or perhaps a
combination of the two, or perhaps a theory based in fraud. All of
these are possible. Of course, this is not to say that there cannot be
a new cause of action carved out of a breach of duty, when it is
shown that the duty existed and that it was breached.
It is necessary to understand the various theories which are
available. Since the various theories contain differing elements, the
facts of the case must be known. Either the forging of an offensive
theory or the defense of a malpractice case must take into account
these elements. The theory of offense and the theory of defense
must be carefully chosen, since ihe choice can have a considerable
effect upon the outcome of the litigation, both for the plaintiff and
the defendant. In the main, it may well determine whether or not
liability exists, and, also, it may be determinative of the type of
damages and the amount of damages recoverable.
B.

EXPRESS CONTRACT

Attorneys, like others, may make contracts. An express contract is merely a very explicit guarantee or agreement to proceed in
a certain manner.8 9 Very few attorneys are foolish enough to ex-,
pressly contract with a client to perform any legal activity in a certain way or to obtain a certain result. It would seem that if an attorney could guarantee results, there would be little necessity for
the exercise of his judgment and, therefore, his employment. Most
attorneys are employed to perform services in which judgment is
required or in which the results are uncertain or variable. There are
few cases. involving the breach of express contracts. In Benard v.
88. Dorfv. Relies. 355 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1966).
89. Alexander . O'Neil. 77 Ariz. 91. 267 P.2d 730. 734(1954).
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Walkup, 90 an attorney entered into a contigent fee agreement with a
client. The contract provided that the attorney was to "commence
and prosecute such claims [of the plaintiff] ... and agree to do all
things necessary to prosecute said claim. "91 For reasons not germane here, the attorney failed to commence the action, which was
subsequently barred by the statute of limitations. The client subsequently failed to bring his action against the attorney within the
two-year statute of limitations which had been held to govern
malpractice actions. The client argued that the longer statute of
limitations, pertaining to instruments in writing, should govern.
The California court agreed with the client, and found that the contractual agreement between the attorney and the client was sufficient to bring it within the terminology and the framework of a
written contract. Thus, the written contract action against the attorney was not barred by the shorter statute of limitations. The
court, in effect, held that the employment contract was an express
92
written contract.
C.

IMPLIED CONTRACT

In cases where an express or written contract is not in
existence, there may be an implied contract which can form the
basis of liability. The breach of implied contract is normally
couched in terms of the failure to exercise reasonable skill and
diligence in the handling of the client's case.
In Solomon v. Meyer, 93 a client delivered money to a trustee in
bankruptcy. The trustee defrauded the client of the money. The
attorney, who was sued by the client, claimed that the client was
experienced in bankruptcy matters and knew that any funds should
have been delivered to the court, not to the trustee personally. The
client, on the other hand, claimed that the attorney failed to advise
him of the proper procedures in dealing with the money. The court,
in reversing a summary judgment for the attorney, held that the
facts stated a cause of action against the attorney in negligence for
failing to perform services "which by implication he agrees to
perform when he accepts employment by a client. "94
An attorney may also be liable for loss of property entrusted to
him as evidenced in Glenn v. Haynes,95 a case in which an attorney
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

272 Cal. App. 2d 595, 77 Cal. Rptr, 544 (1969).
Benard v. Walkup, 272 Cal. App. 2d 595, __,
77 Cal. Rptr. 544, 549 (1969).
Id.
116 So. 2d 37 (Fla. App. 1959).
Soloman v. Meyer, 116 So. 2d 37, 38 (Fla. App. 1959).
192 Va. 574, 66 S.E.2d 509 (1951).
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was held accountable for jewelry belonging to a client which was
stolen from the attorney's home. The court held that when he
assumed control of the property, he impliedly promised to exercise
a reasonable degree of care, skill, and dispatch in protecting his
96
client's interest in the property.
In California an attorney was held by implication to promise
to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as a lawyer of ordinary
skill and capacity ordinarily possesses. 97 In Smith v. Lewis, 98 the
attorney advised his client that her husband's retirement benefits
were not community property subject to division upon divorce.
After being sued, the attorney argued that the law was unsettled at
the time the advice was given. The court, however, found that
enough case law was available so that the attorney should have been
on notice that such benefits might be community property.
But even with respect to an unsettled area of the law, we
believe an attorney assumes an obligation to his client to
undertake reasonable research in an effort to ascertain
relevant legal principles and to make an informed
decision as to a course of conduct based upon an
intelligent assessment of the problem. 9 9
D.

FIDUCIARY DUTY

Attorneys are all too frequently held accountable for breaching
the fiduciary duty which they owe to their clients. Two of the main
areas in which such problems arise are self-dealing and failure to
advise the client of information received which may affect the
manner in which the client conducts his business. A third problem
area, adverse interests, will be discussed later.
The case of Archer v. Griffith, 100 involved a contingent fee
contract entered into after the establishment of the attorney-client
relationship. After the parties negotiated a divorce settlement, the
wife assigned to her attorneys a deed to one-fourth interest in
property she received in the settlement. In holding that the wife
could cancel the deed because the total fee received by the attorney
was exorbitant, the court noted that "[t]he relation between an
attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in nature, and their
96. Glenn v. Haynes. 192 Va. 574,_'
. 66 S.E.2d 509. 512 (1951).
97. Lucas v. Harm. 56 Cal. 2d 583. 364 P.2d 685. 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961). cert. denied, 368
U.S. 987 (1962).
98. 530 P.2d 589. 118 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1975).
99. Smith v.Lewis, 530 P.2d 589, 595. 118 Cal. Rptr. 621, 627 (1975).
100 390 S.W.2d 735 (Tex. 1965).
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dealings with each other are subject to the same scrutiny,
intendments and imputations as a transaction between an ordinary
trustee and his cestui que trust. "101
In Spector v. Mermelstein, 102 an attorney was held responsible to
his client when his investment in a Nevada casino was lost. During
the course of representation the attorney became aware of the
precarious financial condition of the casino. The court found that
the client was unaware of the situation, but had the attorney
performed his fiduciary duty to disclose, the client would not have
lost a quarter of a million dollars. "Mermelstein breached his
fiduciary duties to Spector by failing to inform him fully of facts
known to him ... and by not inquiring further himself when he
became aware of circumstances indicating that his client was not
being fully advised.' '103
E.

NEGLIGENCE

The concept of negligence is one which is quite familiar to
lawyers. It is simply the failure to exercise ordinary care. 10 4 A
research of the cases and articles dealing with attorneys'
malpractice will show that the majority of all legal malpractice cases
fall within this area of potential liability. There are a number of
categories into which the failure to exercise ordinary care will fall.
In some instances there may be more than one failure applicable in
an individual case.
1. Negligent Advise
In this type of case an attorney has almost always given advice
which subsequent events prove should not have been given. There
are two possibilities which naturally arise.
1) Was the advice, at the time given, the advice that an
ordinary prudent person would have given under the same or
similar circumstances?
2) If the advice was not the advice that would have been given
by a reasonably prudent person under the same or similar
circumstances, is there some overriding reason, due to the peculiar
circumstances of the case, which would justify the giving of the
advice?
101.
102.
103.
104.

Archer v. Griffith. 390 S.\V.2d 735, 739 (Tex. 1965).
361 F. Supp. 30(D. N. Y. 1972), aff'd., 485 F.2d 474 (2d Cir. 1973).
Spectorv. Mermelstein, 361 F. Supp. 30, 40 (D.N.Y. 1972).
Hickert v. Wright, 182 Kan. 100, -, 319 P.2d 152, 159(1957).

206

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

The case of Smith v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 105
involved advice given to heirs concerning the alternate valuation
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. The attorney advised the
clients that they could use such provisions under the law as he
understood it. However, the IRS later disallowed the alternate
valuation at a substantial loss to the client. The evidence showed,
however, that attorneys in Louisiana were giving the same advice
based on their interpretation of the law. The court absolved the
attorney of negligence, finding that there was no reason for the
attorney to believe that his advice was not sound at the time it was
given. 106
In Vredenburgh v. Jones,107 an attorney for an estate was charged
with giving negligent advice. The advice surrounded the executor's
self-dealing in estate properties. The attorney advised the executor
that such actions were risky, but that under the circumstances as he
viewed them the transactions would not be subject to attack. While
recognizing that approval of self-dealing would not ordinarily be
condoned, the court found that the attorney believed that the
beneficiaries of the estate knew that the executor was a potential
buyer of the property. Furthermore, the executor had a longstanding relationship of trust with the decedent, and had exercised
great integrity in that capacity. The attorney was exonerated from
liability for failure to advise the executor properly. 108.
2. Failureto advise
Abraham Lincoln is supposed to have said that a lawyer's time
and advice are his stock in trade. His advice, if given, as we have
previously seen, must be given in a prudent manner. But there is,
further, the duty to give advice when the best interests of the client
are at stake. Thus an attorney may not escape responsibility and,
therefore, liability, by standing mute. The attorney-client
relationship is established upon the basis that an attorney has an
affirmative obligation to defend as well as to protect and prosecute
his client's interests.
In Heyer v. Flaig,109 intended beneficiaries under a will sued in
negligence the attorney who drew the will. The testatrix intended to
leave her entire estate to her daughters. She also advised the
attorney that she planned to remarry. Under California law,
remarriage operates to partially revoke the prior will as to the
105. 366 F. Supp. 1283 (D.La. 1973), qff'd., 500 F.2d 1131 (4th Cir. 1974).
106. Smith v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 366 F. Supp. 1283. 1290 (D.La. 1973).
107. 349 A.2d 22 (Del. Chan. 1975).
108. Vredenburgh v. Jones, 349 A.2d 22, 41 (Del. Chan. 1975).
109. 70 Cal. 2d 223. 449 P 2d 161. 74 Cal. Rptr.225 (1969).
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surviving spouse. The attorney failed to include any provisions in
the will to negate this automatic revocation. The testatrix executed
the will and married ten days later. The California Supreme Court,
in reversing the sustained demurrer of the attorney, held not only
that a duty arose to advise the client of the effect of remarriage but
also that the duty, and the negligence, continued after the
execution of the will, up to the time of her death.
Defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiffs to
effectuate in a non-negligent manner the testamentary
scheme of the testatrix. Such a duty may extend beyond
the date of the original drafting of the will when the
attorney's negligent acts created a defective estate plan
upon which the client might rely until her death.1 10
Thus the development of several possibilities can be seen. 1)
An attorney has a duty to advise, when his client's interest requires
it; 1 ' 2) When an attorney gives advice, he must give it correctly, 1or12
exercise due care or reasonable care in the giving of such advice;
3) There is always the third possibility that an attorney does not
know what to advise; or 4) The attorney may be ignorant of the fact
that advice is necessary. In those instances where an attorney is
ignorant of the fact that advice is necessary, it would appear
reasonable that liability would attach.' 11 But in instances where an
attorney advised his client, properly, that he did not know the
correct advice to give, it would appear as though liability should
not and would not attach. 114 It is reasonable, however, to assume
that where an attorney did not know the proper advice to give, and
so advised his client, the attorney might be under an obligation to
recommend to his client where the proper advice might be
obtained. 115
3. Attorney's Reliance Upon Adverse Parties
It is a practice in some jurisdictions for an attorney to rely, by
agreement, upon his adversary attorney to carry out certain actions
110. Heyerv. Flaig, 70Cal. 2d 223,
- , 449 P.2d 161, 166, 74Cal. Rptr. 225,
- (1969).
111. Rice v. Forestier, 415 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. Civ. App. 1-967).
112. Heyer v. Flaig, 70 Cal. 2d 223, 449 P.2d 161, 74 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1969).
113. Smith v. Lewis. 530 P.2d 589, 118 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1975).
114. Wilderman v. Wachtell, 149 Misc. 623, 267 N.Y.S. 840 (1933).
115. A.B.A. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-101(A)(1); Lucas v. Hamm, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 727 (App. 1961). The supreme court decision in Lucas did not discuss or comment upon the
lower court's holding that such a duty exists. Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal.
Rptr. 821 (1961), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962).
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which are to the benefit of the client. In Sarti v. Udall,116 a client
engaged defendant attorney to represent him in a property
settlement. The defendant attorney relied upon his opposing
counsel to draft the document to culminate the property division
and failed to check the document drawn by his adversary to
ascertain whether or not it provided his client with the division to
which he was entitled. The client sued the defendant when it was
discovered that the executed agreement did not give the client his
share of the property. The defendant claimed that he had relied
upon his opposing counsel to draft the document, pursuant to their
agreement to divide the property evenly and furthermore, that it
was the practice in the community to rely upon opposing counsel to
properly describe property in deeds and other instruments. Upon
trial, the trial judge granted a summary judgment for the attorney.
The case was reversed on appeal. The court spoke to the fact that
the attorney owed to the client a duty to exercise reasonable skill
and care in the carrying out of his duties. It went on to hold that
whether or not the attorney had satisfied his obligations which he
undertook in the representation of the claim was a question of fact
to be decided by the jury, considering all of the facts and
circumstances surrounding the case. 117 It was further noted that the
custom and practice in the community between attorneys was not
determinative of the degree of skill exercised by the attorney. 118
This defense seems rather transparent. The system under
which attorneys practice is an adversary system. If an attorney
employed to represent a client's interests was entitled to rely upon
opposing counsel, why would the client need an attorney at all?
Could not the client approach his adversary's attorney and expect
the same treatment that his counsel would have received?
Obviously not. Our system of justice does not allow an attorney to
represent adverse interests.119 "To have an attorney standing in
open court before a jury and the public, ... attempting to represent
conflicting interests creates a situation which should never occur
under our adversary system of trying cases." 1 2 0 It would seem that
where an attorney relies upon the opposing counsel to protect his
client, it should be negligence as a matter of law, because by
surrendering supervision to his adversary, he creates a situation
where the opposing counsel has assumed the burden of
representing adverse interests.
116.91 Ariz. 24, 369 P.2d 92 (1962).
117. Sarti v. Udall. 91 Ariz. 24,
, 369 P.2d92. 93 (1962).
118. Id. at -. 369 P.2d at 93-94 (Struckmever,,J.. concurring).
119J.W. Hill & Sons v. Wilson. 399 S.W.2d 152 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
120. Id. at 154.
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4. Co- Counsel or Referring Counsel Liability
It has become a widespread practice in legal circles for
attorneys to associate co-counsel in the conduct of certain legal
activities and to "refer out" certain legal activities to other
attorneys, particularly in fields of specialization, such as personal
injuries and/or securities work. It is also a common practice that
the attorney who has associated counsel or referred out the legal
business may in some instances participate in the fee generated by
the handling of the co-counsel or the referring attorney. This is,
however, subject to the ABA Rules and Canons of Ethics, which
provide that: "A lawyer shall not divide a fee for legal services with
another lawyer who is not a partner in or associate of his law firm or
law office, unless: ... (2) The division is made in proportion to the

services performed and responsibility assumed by each. "121
In cases with this particular problem, it would appear that the
liability of the initiating attorney and the co-counsel and/or
referring attorney may be joint and several if the action is based on
contract or upon the theory of negligence. The better rule may be
that where an attorney retains any interest in the fee to be
generated or exercises any control or participation whatsoever, he
is as responsible as the one who has primary control over the legal
action pending. 1 22 Where, however, an attorney has referred the
client to another attorney to handle the case entirely, independent
of the originating attorney, where there has been a severance of the
attorney-client relationship, it would appear that liability would not
follow. 123

5. Duty to Associate
The burgeoning complexity of modern business, the national
aspect and multinational scope of many businesses, and their
associated legal problems, has created a new legal duty for lawyers.
It is generally recognized that no attorney is competent to practice
in many diverse fields and in numerous jurisdictions without the
help of those who know the local rules and ever-changing
regulations and laws. It is, without doubt, a requirement that
prudent practitioners should associate local counsel in foreign
jurisdictions where the attorney has not previously practiced, to aid
121. A. B. A. CODE OF PROFESSIONAl, RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-107 (A) (2).

122. Floro v. Lawton. 187 Cal. App. 2d 657, lOCal. Rptr. 98(1961).
123. Cf \Vilderman v. \Vachtell. 149 Misc. 623. 267 N.Y.S. 840 (1933)(New York lawyer not
liable for Pennsylvania co-COLISel's failure to file lis pendens, despite 50-50 fee splitting
arrangement).
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the attorney in advising his client with regard to legal activity.
The old adage, "a jack-of- all-trades but a master of none," is
more applicable to the legal profession, perhaps, than to any other.
The failure of an attorney to recognize his own limitations has been
the cause of much fruitful litigation. In Degen v. Steinbrink,124 an
attorney was employed to secure properly recorded chattel
mortgages in several states to protect a lender's interests. He failed
to do so, which failure led to a lender's loss when the borrower went
into bankruptcy. In the suit which followed, the court held that the
attorney who is employed to obtain correctly filed chattel mortgages
is expected to know that the law governing the recording of liens
differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Furthermore, the very fact
that the attorney undertook to perform the legal work was a
representation that he was capable of competently performing it.
The court, in reaching a very correct conclusion, held that if an
attorney does not have sufficient ability to act skillfully, then he
125
should not undertake the employment.
Will an attorney who associates for the specific purpose of
obtaining advice with regard to foreign law be held responsible if
the local counsel which he associates is guilty of negligent conduct?
Contrary to the results which have been reached with regard to a
co-counsel or a referring attorney, the rule seems to be that an
advising attorney with regard to foreign jurisdiction or foreign law
cannot have his negligence imputed to the attorney who prudently
associated him for the purpose of advice. In Wildermann v.
Wachtell, 126 a New York court refused to find liability against a New
York attorney who had acted prudently in selecting foreign counsel
for advice. In that case, the New York attorney advised his client
that it would be necessary to associate Pennsylvania counsel. A
meeting between the New York counsel, the Pennsylvania counsel,
and the client took place. At the meeting the client entered into a
formal retainer agreement, employing both New York and
Pennsylvania counsel on a fifty percent contingency basis. At the
meeting the Pennsylvania counsel was informed that it would be
necessary to file a lis pendens by the 5th of April 1921, in order to
have a collectible claim. The lis pendens was never filed. The New
York counsel was sued by the client. The court decided that where
an attorney, recognizing his lack of knowledge, advises the retention
of additional counsel, a shield from liability is created where the
124. 202 App. Div. 477, 195 N.Y.S. 810(1922).
125. Degen v. Steinbrink, 202 App. Div. 477, __,
126. 149 Misc. 623, 267 N.Y.S. 840 (1933).
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associated counsel is negligent. 127 To decide otherwise would hold
an attorney to a degree of care which he had acknowledged to the
client he did not have. An attorney must exercise some care,
however, in selecting associate counsel or he may be held liable for
negligence. In Tormo v. Yormak, 128 a New York lawyer referred his
client to a New Jersey lawyer, who subsequently embezzled the
client's money. The court held that the referring attorney generally
has no duty to check into the background of the referral lawyer. But
such a duty arose when the referring attorney became aware that
his New Jersey counterpart had unethically solicited the business of
the client, in disregard of professional standards. The lack of
follow-up action by the referring attorney was held to be sufficient
129
grounds for a jury question on negligence.
6. Lapse of Time Requirements
By far the leader in circumstances which bring out attorneys'
malpractice is the lapse of time requirements including failure to
13 0 failure to serve summons, 13 1
meet the statute of limitations,
to
ignoring bill of particulars, 13 2 failure to appear at trial, 133 failure 36
35 and failure to file a claim. 1
4
prosecute
to
failure
13
file pleadings,
In the Texas case of Oldham v. Sparks, 137 an attorney failed to
collect a debt which had been in his hands for several years. The
statute of limitations finally barred any future collection. The court
held that the facts alone established sufficient negligence as a matter
of law to render the attorney liable to his client. But the court went
on to hold that proof that he had failed to collect the claim did not
establish that it was now uncollectible. The attorney escaped
liability due to the failure of the plaintiff's counsel to prove all the
necessary elements of his claim.
Furthermore, in the case of Shelly v. Hansen, 138 two attorneys
combined in failing to perfect their client's claim. The client, a
contractor, sought payment of incurred bills. The first attorney
127. Id. at 625, 267 N.Y.S. at 842.
128.398F. Supp. 1159 (D.N.J. 1975).
129. Tormo v. Yormak, 398 F. Supp. 1159, 1171-72 (D.N.J. 1975).
130. See Thompson v. Ervings Hatcheries, Inc., 186 S. 2d 756 (Miss. 1966).
131. See Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 491 P.2d 421, 98
Cal. Rptr. 837 (1971).
132. See Boin v. Equitable Life Assur., 28 Misc. 2d 489, 208 N. Y. S.2d 323 (1960).
See Warwick, Paul, & Warwick v. Dotter 190 So. 2d 596 (Fla. App. 1966).
134. See Masters v. Dunstan, 256 N.C. 520, 124 S.E.2d 574 (1962).
135. SeeCarpenterv. Weichert, 51 App. Div. 817, 379 N.Y.S.2d 191 (1976).
136. SeeWinterv. Brown, 365 A.2d 381 (D.C. 1976). See also Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 5 (1956).
137. 28 Tex. 425 (1886).
138. 244 Cal. App. 2d 210, 53 Cal. Rptr. 20 (1966).
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sought to foreclose a mechanic's lien, but his failure to file a lis
pendens resulted in a dismissal without prejudice to file a suit in
contract. Despite instructions, the second attorney failed to proceed
within the statute of limitations on the contract action. The court
held "[T]he negligence in question consisted of defendant's
continuing omission to take timely action, in direct disobedience of
plaintiff's instructions, against defendants of sufficient solvency...
''139

In the time lapse cases it is necessary to prove that the time
lapse has resulted in definite damage to the client before the client is
allowed a recovery. In McDow v. Dixon, 140 suit proceeded against an
attorney for allowing the statute of limitations to run on a cliam for
personal injuries. The plaintiff failed to introduce evidence of the
solvency of the defendant. But since an insurance company had
offered the plaintiff a settlement in the original suit, the court
allowed her to recover the amount offered by way of settlement
from her negligent attorney. The court stated that "a client suing
his attorney for malpractice not only must prove that his claim was
valid and would have resulted in a judgment in his favor, but also
that said judgment would have been collectible in some amount, for
14
therein lies the measure of his damages." 1
The trend in the area of professional liability is toward
increasing liability. Veiled defenses or transparent defenses are
frequently struck down, which is as it should be. The profession, in
order to grow effectively, must assume larger areas of responsibility
and be willing to be held accountable for failure to act with the
proper degree of care. This was recognized in Donald v. Garry, 142 a
case in which a credit bureau collection agency was employed to
collect a debt. An attorney employed by the agency filed a suit to
enforce the debt but the suit was subsequently dismissed for lack of
diligent prosecution. The creditor sued the attorney-employee of
the collection agency. The trial court found no liability, allowing
the defense of lack of privity. The appellate court of California held
that California law does not require privity for an attorney to be
held liable for negligence. The court said, in support of that
argument that "[a] policy that lawsuits should be diligently
prosecuted.

.

.

would be frustrated by permitting the dilatory

lawyer the luxury of insulation from liability because he was
139.
140.
141.
142.

Shidh v. Hansen. 244CaL App. 2d 210, _
.53 Cal. Rptr. 20, 23(1966).
138 Ga. App. 388. 226S.E.2d 145(1976).
McDow v. Dixon. 138 Ct. App. 388. _
226 S.F.2d 145. 147 (1976).
19Cal. App. 3d 769. 97 Cal. Rprr. 191 (1971)-
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employed by a collection agency serving as an intermediary rather
than by the client. .. 143
7. Failureto ProperlyInvestigate
The very nature of the legal business requires investigation
and the procuring of facts so that the lawyer can then best use his
judgment to represent the client. This investigation, where done by
the client and delivered to the attorney, may be relied upon by the
attorney as being accurate and may form the basis for opinions and
actions, without liability. 1 44 "However, an attorney need not
inquire into matters that do not pertain to the discharge of duties
that he has undertaken. .

.

. Likewise, an attorney need not make

inquiry where the responsibility of the matter is assumed by the
45
client. "1'
Where the attorney undertakes to investigate, however, which
would include the taking of statements, the location and
interviewing of witnesses, or search of public records, the
investigation must be undertaken in a non-negligent manner. A
negligently conducted investigation which results subsequently in
negligent legal activity or advice may result in liability. In Owen v.
Neely, 146 the court stated that "whether Mr. Neely, upon
discovering the discrepancies...
))147
is a factual question ....

should have pursued an inquiry.

Finally, if investigation is necessary, the failure of an attorney
to undertake it, or to see that the client undertakes the
investigation, may result in the attorney's liability. It is clearly
upon the attorney to make recommendations as to what must be
undertaken, so that the rights of the client might be protected. 148
IV. LIABILITY TO OTHERS THAN THE CLIENT
A.

STATEMENT

Lawyers do not operate in a vacuum. They are compelled to
interact with people to effectuate the reason for their existence. The
normal malpractice case is where a lawyer has represented a client
143. Donald v. Carry. 19 Cal. App. 3d 769. 772, 97 Cal. Rptr. 191. 192 (1971).
144. Kurtenbach v. TeKippe. 260 N.W.2d 53 (Iowa 1977): Bolcy v. Boley. 506 S.W.2d 934
(Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
145. Hansen v. \Vightman. 14 Wash. App. 78. _.
538 P.2d 1238. 1245 (1975).
146. 471 S.W.2d 705 (Ky. App. 1971).
147. Owen v. Nec'. 471 S.\V.2d 705. 708 (Ky. App. 1971).
148. \atkins v. Sheppard. 278 So. 2d 890 (La. App. 1973).

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

who employed him and is now complaining of the services
performed. There are instances, however, in which the lawyer may
be liable to a non-client he never knew and who never employed
him.
B. Two RULES
1. Majority
The majority rule is that a lawyer may not be held liable by
those who never employed him. The basis for this rule is privity.
The rule, which established that privity is an element which must
be established in order to maintain a suit, was first recognized in
the case of Winterbottom v. Wright. 149 Privity has been defined as
being "a mutual or successive relationship to the same rights of
property, or such an identification in interest of one person with
another as to represent the same legal rights.'" 150
Privity, thus merely meaning a relational interest, has served
to protect attorneys from liability where they were sued by persons
not the client of the attorney. 15 1 The leading American case to
adopt the privity rule was National Savings Bank v. Ward.152 In that
case the defendant attorney was employed by the apparent owner
of realty, to determine title to the property. The attorney
investigated the title and issued a certificate that hsis client was the
owner. In reliance upon the attorney's certificate, a bank took a
deed of trust upon the property in return for a loan. Upon default
and attempted foreclosure, it was determined that there was a
defect in the title, created by the borrower who had previously
transferred title to others. For reasons unknown, the attorney, in
making the title search, had failed to uncover the previous
conveyance. Since the borrower could not pay, the bank sought out
the next best avenue of recovery by suing the attorney. The
Supreme Court held that the attorney could not be liable, since
there was no contract or direct communication between the
attorney and the bank. In citing Winterbottom, the court held that
"the general rule is that the obligation of the attorney is to his client
153
and not to a third party."

The Ward decision did note that there could be exceptions to
149. 10M. &W. 109. 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
150. Dillard v. McKnight, 34 Cal. 2d 309, 209 P.2d 387, 392 (1949), citing 50 C.J.S.Judgments
§788 at 324-25 (1947).
151. Seeannot., 45 A.L.R.3d 1181 (1972).
152. 100 U.S. 195(1879).
153. National Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 200 (1879).
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the general rule, where there was collusion, fraud, or negligence of
54
such degree as to be eminently dangerous to the lives of others. 1
Very likely, barring these, as well as intentional bad faith conduct,
it would appear that privity would ordinarily be required before an
attorney could be held responsible In a malpractice action.
2. Minority
The California courts have been in the forefront of attack upon
the privity rule with regard to attorneys' liability. The citadel of
privity was first successfully attacked in the case of MacPherson v.
Buick Motor Co. 155 With the first chip in the edifice of privity, other
compelling reasons began to come forth to show the impropiety of
applying privity to all instances regardless of the facts and
compelling considerations. The trend toward a declining privity
defense is a continuing one. 1 56 While the effects of MacPherson have
most prominently been felt in the area of personal injury and
product liability, it has also had its impact in areas where the
performance of services between two agreeing parties has had a
harmful effect upon a third. Prior to MacPherson, privity would have
prevented any liability, or shielded an attorney from any liability to
a third party.
But privity is being successfully attacked. In the New York
case of Glanzer v. Shepard,157 a public weigher, hired to weigh bags of
beans for sale, came up short. The purchaser sued the weigher and
the New York Court of Appeals, Justice Cardozo writing, as he did
in MacPherson, recognized the weigher's liability. He argued that
liability rested not upon the relationship between the two who had
agreed to utilize his services, but upon a duty the weigher owed to
the public. This duty was independent of any considerations of
contract or privity. Furthermore, the duty arose from the
consequences of being in the public weighing business. 158 Since the
very existence of a weight certificate is to promote commerce, it is
necessary that the duty of being a public weigher be performed in a
non-negligent manner. The court discussed the Ward decision, but
distinguished it upon the basis that in the Ward case the particular
consequences of the attorney's activities could not have been
anticipated by the attorney. 1 59 Whereas, in the Glanzer case, the
154. Id. at 203.
155. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
156. Annot., 45 A.L.R.3d, supra note 155, at 1185; [1974] PRODUCT LIABILITY REP. (CCH)
4504.
157. 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275(1922).
158. Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 238, 135 N.E. 275, 275-76 (1922).
159. Id. at 240, 135 N.E. at 276.
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consequences of negligence could certainly be expected and
anticipated.
Prior to 1958 California followed the majority rule, the leading
case in that jurisdiction being Buckley v. Gray. 160 But in 1958, in
Biakanja v. Irving,161 the California court rejected the privity
requirement in a case involving a negligently constructed will with
a lack of proper attestation. The losing beneficiary under the will
sued the notary that had prepared the will for the amount that he
had lost. The court, in allowing recovery, stated the following:
The determination whether in a specific case the
defendant will be held liable to a third person not in
privity is a matter of policy and involves the balancing of
various factors, among which are 1) the extent to which
the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, 2) the
foreseeability of harm to him, 3) the degree of certainty
that the plaintiff suffered injury, 4) the closeness of the
connection between the defendant's conduct and the
injury suffered, 5) the moral blame attached to the
defendant's conduct, and 6) the policy of preventing
future harm.

162

The court discussed all six of the factors and, having found
them satisfied, allowed recovery against the notary. While the
fall of privity in California began with a notary and the
unauthorized practice of law, it soon became the law applicable to
licensed attorneys. In Lucas v. Hamm, 163 a trust which was
successfully attacked on the basis of the rule against perpetuities
resulted in the drafter of the will being sued. The attorney was
sued upon the theory of negligence and breach of contract. The
breach of contract theory was that the legatees were third party
beneficiaries of the contract between the deceased and the drafting
attorney. The trial court, relying upon the majority rule previously
discussed, dismissed the action. The California Suprme Court
affirmed the dismissal by the trial court, but sent a message by its
decision. It held that the plaintiff had stated a valid cause of action
under the theory of negligence and third party beneficiary
contract. 164 But, since the alienation and perpetuity statutes
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

1 10Cal. 339, 42 P. 900(1895).
49 Ca!. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16(1958).
Biakanja %. Irving. 49 Cal. 2d 647,
, 320 P.2d 16. 19 (1958).
56 Cal. 2d 583. 364 P.2d 685. 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961). cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962).
Idf. at
. 364 P.2d at 689. 15 Cal. Rptr. at 825.
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involved were so complicated, a failure to comply with them did not
constitute sufficient grounds for the imposition of liability. 165 Thus,
in effect, by the decision'the supreme court stated that, "from
here on," privity is dead with regard to attorney's malpractice.
This is the first decision in the United States to hold that an
attorney could be held responsible by a non-client under the
theories of negligence and third party beneficiary contract. In Lucas
the court considered the six items on the checklist first appearing in
Biakanja, but in place of the fifth item on the checklist they added a
new factor: "[W]hether the recognition of liability to beneficiaries
of wills negligently drawn by attorneys would impose an undue
burden on the profession." ' 166 The modified test in Lucas has been
followed by numerous other decisions in California. Now, not only
does one find successful suits by will beneficiaries, but also
attorneys for collection agencies being held responsible by creditors
where the attorney fails to properly pursue the prosecution and
collection of the debt. 16 7 Beginning with California, other
jurisdictions have followed in allowing attorneys to be held
accountable by non-clients.
In Licata v. Spector,168 the Connecticut court held that an
attorney could be liable to a beneficiary of a will whose interest in
the will was defeated by an improper attestation. The following
three-prong test was used by the Court:
1) whether or not the injury to the plaintiff was foreseeable,
2) whether or not the contract producing the performance was
an incident to the enterprise of the lawyer, and
3) whether or not there were adequate policy reasons for the
imposition of a duty of care to avoid the risks encountered. 169
In discussing the three-prong test, the court found that all of
the circumstances would justify the imposition of liability. One of
the determining arguments was that liability should be allowed,
because without the allowance of liability, persons who were
damaged could not protect themselves from the negligent practice
of law. The court cited both the Biakanja and Lucas decisions. In the
Louisiana case of Woodfork v. Sanders, 170 the court permitted liability
to a will beneficiary under a theory which resembles the third party
beneficiary argument found in Lucas. The argument of the court
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Idat___ , 364 P.2d at 690, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 826.
Id. at - , 364 P.2d at 688, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 824.
Donald v. Garry, 19 Cal. App. 3d 769, 97 Cal. Rptr. 191 (1971).
26
Conn. Supp. 378, 225 A.2d 28 (1966).
Licata v. Spector, 26Conn. Supp. 378, 225 A.2d 28, 29-30 (1966).
248 So. 2d 419 (La. App. 1971).
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was that the testator sought the attorney's professional assistance in
an effort to benefit the person to whom the interests under the will
were left. The attorney's mistake in preparing the will defeated the
intention of the testator and resulted in a contractual breach, which
was really for the benefit of the legatee. The court found that a
" ' No mention was made of the
cause of action would exist. 17
California decisions.
The Iowa Supreme Court, in Ryan v. Kanne, 172 found liability
against an accountant where the party harmed had relied upon an
accounting statement prepared by the accountant, and which the
accountant knew would be relied upon by the harmed party. The
court's test was whether or not a person claiming a breach of duty
could be foreseen to be a member of a class of persons contemplated
by the services provider. 17 3 Thus, if the accountant could recognize
that the party harmed would rely upon the services rendered, then
he had a duty to him to non-negligently perform the services. In
telegraphing the rule to be subsequently applied, the court stated as
follows: "We... recognize that the same rule may be applicable in
other recognized professions, such as abstracters and attorneys. '174
The court cited Licata, Biakanja, and Lucas.
Of course, the demise of privity has been witnessed in the
product liability and negligence field with regard to personal
injuries. The advent of the California decisions and those that have
followed may well portend the same demise of privity with regard
to professional liability. The California movement has been
accepted everywhere it has been considered, except in New York,
where since the case of Hakala v. VanSchaick, 175 the rule of privity
has been followed. The Lucas rule was subsequently explicitly
rejected in Maneri v. Amodeo. 176 Some reluctance could subsequently
be seen in Victor v. Goldman, 177 wherein it was noted that the court
was bound by Hakala, but referred to the California Lucas decision
as "well considered.' 1 78 How much longer New York can keep
these decisions in harmony with Glanzer v. Shepard,179 will be
interesting.. It is yet to be seen whether or not privity will continue
to retreat. It is believed that for the benefit of the profession that
more and more responsibility will have to be shouldered, thus
increasing the incidence of liability and demise of privity.
171. Woodfork v. Sanders, 248So. 2d419, 425 (La. App. 1971).
172. 170 N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 1969).
173. Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.W.2d 395, 401 (Iowa 1969).
174. Id at 402.
175. 171 Misc. 418, 12 N.Y.S.2d 928 (1939).
176. 38 Misc. 2d 190, 238 N.Y.S.2d 302 (1963).
177. 74 Misc. 2d 685, 344 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1973).
178. Victor v. Goldman, 74 Misc. 2d 685-__, 344 N.Y.S.2d 672, 673-74 (1973).
179. 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
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V. BURDEN OF PROOF
A.

STATEMENT

It will come as no surprise that a person asserting a
malpractice action must carry the burden of proof. The extent of
this burden of proof must be recognized by the person bringing the
action so that his evidence will meet the elements necessary to be
proved in order to effect a recovery. Considered here generally will
be the burden of proof necessary, but particular cases have
particular requirements. In an early case, Maryland Casualty Co. v.
Price, 180 the court held that in a suit against an attorney for
negligence the plaintiff must prove the following three elements:
1) The attorney's employment,
2) Negligence in the performance of his duty, and
3) That the breach of duty was a proximate cause of loss to the
plaintiff. 11
The Price case was specifically adopted in Weiner v. Morena. 182
The latter court, after research in the matter, stated that Price "is a
landmark decision concerning legal malpractice cases and the rule
it established has been adopted in approximately forty-five
states."1 83 Now considered will be how the interrelationship of the
Price decision bears upon the burden of proof in a malpractice
action.
B.

THREE BURDENS

1. Employment
It has previously been discussed that proof of employment may
be necessary in the usual action for malpractice. It has likewise
been seen that liability to others may arise in a quasi-employment
situation. This burden must be met before proceeding to the next
burden. 184
2. Breach Causing
Loss
The second burden of proof with regard to breach of a duty
has been discussed thoroughly in the case of Dorf v. Relles. 185 There
the court stated as follows:
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

231 F. 397 (4th Cir. 1916).
Maryland Cas. Co. v. Price, 231 F. 397, 401 (4th Cir. 1916).
271 So. 2d 217 (Fla. App. 1973).
Weinerv. Morena, 271 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. App. 1973).
Godbout v. Norton 262, N.W.2d 374 (Minn. 1977).
355 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1966).
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[Tjhere is no presumption that an attorney has been
guilty of a want of care, arising merely from his failure to
be successful in an undertaking. On the contrary, he is
always entitled to the benefit of the rule that everyone is
presumed to have discharged his duty, whether legal or
moral, until the contrary is made to appear. In a suit
against an attorney for negligence, the burden is,
therefore, on the plaintiff to allege and prove every fact
essential to establish defendant's duty and a violation of
it.''

186

Assuming a breach of duty can be proved, the necessary
connection (i. e., causation) between such breach and loss must
also be established. This, in the opinion of most writers, has been
the most difficult problem to surmount in a legal malpractice
case.18 7 This causation burden is related to the burden of breach
and the burden of loss.
3. Loss Caused by Breach
This is the most unique problem involved with the burden of
proof in a legal malpractice case.
In most legal malpractice actions, not only must there be proof
that the attorney breached a duty, but, likewise, proof that butfor
the breach of duty the client would not have been harmed.' 8 8 This
is sometimes very difficult, particularly when there may be the
intervening aspects of jury deliberation, judge's decision, or
perhaps the actions or conduct of other persons not under the
control of the plaintiff. 18 9 This unique causation burden has been
given the title, "A Suit Within A Suit," 190 because of the
additional burden encountered by one who would seek to hold an
attorney repsonsible in a case of negligence. In McAleenan v.
Massachusetts Bonding and Insurance Co., 191 the court described it as
follows:
186. Dorf%. Reles. 355 F.2d 488. 492 (7th Cir. 1966). Seealso Hurd v. Dimento & Sullivan. 440
F.2d 1322 (1st Cir. 1971). cert. denied. 404 U. S. 862 (1971): Mazer v. Security Ins. Group, 368 F.
Supp. 418 (D. Penn. 1973), aff'd, 507 F.2d 1338 (3d Cir. 1975): Christy v. Saliterman, 288 Minn.
144, 179 N.W.2d 288(1970).
187. Hardingv. Bell, 265 Or. 202, 508 P.2d 216(1973): Annot.. 45 A.L.R.2d 5,26 (1956).
188. Gibson v. Johnson. 414 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 946
(1968).
189. Coggin, Attornel Negligence ...A Suit Within a Suit, 60 W. VA. L. REV. 225 (1968): Wade,
supra note 43.
190. Coggin. supra note 189.
191. 232 N.Y. 199. 133 N.E. 444(1921).
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One who seeks to hold another responsible for neglect in
the conduct of litigation must show that the action which
had been neglected would probably have been successful,
and therefore that its neglect has directly resulted in
damages measured by the value or amount of the rights
92
which were lost by the default. 1
Another court stated the issue as follows: "One who
establishes malpractice. . . must also prove that careful
management. . . would have resulted in recovery of a favorable
judgment. . . or, in case of a defense, that proper handling would
have resulted in a judgment for the client." 193 Why this particular
burden should have arisen has been the topic of much debate, some
courts holding that this rule is no heavier a burden than the one
which is generally imposed upon all plaintiffs in negligence
actions. 194 Other courts justify it upon the basis that an attorney
should not be held responsible in damages, admitting negligence,
where it was an impossible case anyway. 195 Or, as stated by one
court, "an attorney's failure. . . may not well be held the proximate
cause of the loss in whole or in part of a cause of action to a client
who has no cause of action.' '196 Others see the additional causation
burden as merely an extension of the object of a malpractice action,
that being to compensate the client for the value of the loss suffered,
and no more. The argument proceeds that if the breach of duty by
the attorney caused a certain loss, this loss is the client's burden to
prove what proper handling would have gained or not lost. 197
It is believed that in an appropriate case this additional
causation requirement of proof would be subject to attack. Perhaps
the burden should shift to the guilty party to prove that the suit
would not have been successful or was incapable of being
defended. 198 It seems a bit incredulous for an attorney who has
been proved to have been negligent to be able to step back and say,
"Well, nothing could have been done anyway." If this were true,
the attorney should have so advised the client originally and the
representation should not have been undertaken in the first place.
192. McAleenan v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 232 N.Y. 199. , 133 N.E. 444, 446
(1921).
193. Campbell v. Magana, 184 Cal. App. 2d 751, __ , 8 Cal. Rptr. 32, 33 (1960).
194. Hardingv. Bell. 265 Or. 202. 508 P.2d 216 (1973).
195. Niosi v. Aiello, 69 A.2d 57 (D.C. 1949).
196. Johnson v. Haskins. 119 S.W.2d 235, 236 (Mo. 1938).
197. Sitton v. Clements, 257 F. Supp. 63 (E.D. Tenn. 1966), aff'd 385 F.2d 869 (6th Cir. 1967);
Trustees of Schools v. Schroeder, 2 Ill. App. 3d 1009, 278 N.E.2d 431 (1971).
198. Haughey, supra note 67, at 893.
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VI. MEASURE OF DAMAGES
A.

STATEMENT

The general rule of compensatory damages applies in a
malpractice action. That is, one should be compensated for the
actual damages sustained or for the losses actually suffered. 19 9
While the aggrieved client should not be rewarded unduly, neither
should he be discriminated against merely because his claim
happens to be against a lawyer. Therefore, depending upon the
theory of action brought, ordinarily the measure of damages for
what particular theory will apply.
B.

VALUE

OF THE

CLAIM

LOST,

OR AMOUNT

OF JUDGMENT

SUFFERED

Many malpractice cases have arisen in which a client has lost
an apparently valid claim against another person due to the neglect
or breach of duty of an attorney. Instances of this would be where
cases have been dismissed for want of prosecution, 20 0 or where
there has been a failure to file a timely notice of claim, 20 1 or perhaps
of an appeal.2 0 2 There are instances in which there has been a
failure to bring the action within the required statute of limitations
period.2 0 3 In contrast to a valid affirmative claim being lost due to
legal malpractice, there are also instances in which liability has
been created against an attorney as a result of legal malpractice.
This would include cases in which the attorney had made an
unauthorized appearance, 20 4 or failed to appear at all. 20 5 In most
cases in which an affirmative claim has been lost, 20 6 or in which a
liability has been created, 20 7 the measure of damages is for the
20 8
actual amount involved, plus interest where applicable.
C.

OTHER MEASURES OF DAMAGES

Uncomplicated fact situations have been discussed in which
199. Wimsatt v. Hayden Oil Co., 414 S.W.2d 908 (Ky. 1967).
200. Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626(1962).
201. McLellan v. Fuller, 226 Mass. 517, 115 N.E. 481 (1917).
202. Pete v. Henderson, 124 Cal. App. 2d 487, 269 P.2d 78 (1954).
203. Parker-Smith v. Prince Mfg. Co., 172 App. Div. 302, 158 N.Y.S. 346 (1916).
204. Post v. Charlesworth, 66 Hun. 256. 21 N.Y.S. 168 (App. 1892).
205. Warwick. Paul & Warwick v. Dotter, 190 So. 2d 596 (Fla. App. 1966).
206. Smith v. Lewis, 118 Cal. Rptr. 621, 530 P.2d 589 (1975).
207. Better Homes, Inc., v. Rodgers, 195 F. Supp. 93 (D.W.Va. 1961).
208. Kukla v. Perry, 361 Mich. 311, 105 N.W.2d 176(1960).
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claims have been lost or liability has been created. The theory and
concept of the damages is easily seen. But there are instances in
which the damages are not liquidated. Instances in which attorneys
have been responsible and a particular measure of damages has
been announced, include the following: 1) Where an attorney has
failed to account to his client for "moneys collected," the measure
of damages has been held to be the amount collected, plus
interest. 20 9 2) In instances where an attorney has failed to properly
examine title to property, the amount necessary to discharge a
recorded lien missed by the attorney has been held to be the
measure of damages. 210 In a still more complicated case, Ramp v. St.
PaulFire and Marine Insurance Co., 2 11 an attorney negligently advised
the client to execute a compromise agreement for $1,000 which
ultimately resulted in loss of heirship rights valued at $43,000. The
court held that the proper measure of damages was the reasonable
cost of repairing the damage caused by the attorney's negligence,
and... damages in connection with the additional cost of
upsetting the compromise. These included the additional
costs of resisting the judicial enforcement of the
compromise in the trial court, of appealing and obtaining
reversal of the adverse trial court judgment, and of
appearing and arguing before the Supreme Court when
2 12
certiorari was granted to the executrix.
The court refused to permit recovery, as a part of the damages, the
second attorney's fee actually paid under a contingent fee contract
for bringing the malpractice suit, but instead allowed fees based on
2 13
+he actual time expended by the successful attorney.
In addition to the recovery of the proper measure of damages,
the courts have, in appropriate cases, allowed the recovery of costs
and expenses. 214 Also, in an appropriate case, if malpractice has
resulted in a client losing his case of exemplary damages, the erring
2 15
attorney may be held responsible.
Exemplary damages may also be recovered against an
attorney where he has been found guilty of malicious, intentional,
209. Bar Ass'n of Baltimore City v. Marshall, 269 Md. 510, 307 A.2d 577 (1973).
210.Jacobsen v. Petersen, 91 N.J.L. 404, 103 A. 983, aff'd, 92 N.J.L. 631, 105 A. 894 (1918).
211. 542 So. 2d 79 (La. App. 1971).
212. Ramp v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 254 So. 2d 79, 83 (La. App. 1971).
213. Id.
214. RePass v. Vreeland, 357 F. 2d 801 (3d Ci. 1966); French v. Armstrong, 80 N.J.L. 152,76
A. 336(1910).
215. Patterson & Wallace v. Frazer, 79 S.W. 1077 (Tex. Civ. App. 1904).
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or conscious indifference.

21 6

Yet, in the case of Welder v. Mercer,2 17 a

differentiation was made between "conscious indifference" and
"gross negligence," allowing punitive damages in the former but
not the latter instance. Since the ordinary definition of "gross
negligence" usually includes "conscious indifference,'' 2 18 the
differentiation is difficult to follow.
VII. CONCLUSION
While the concept of legal malpractice is quite old, over the
years there has not been much movement in the area. The
reluctance of the early Bar to countenance a malpractice action
against a fellow practitioner can be somewhat analogized to the
present "conspiracy of silence" which infects the medical
profession. But as the Bar has continued to grow, and recently
mushroom in size, the interrelationship of practioners has broken
down this protective camaraderie. This, when combined with the
press of more enlightened clientele, predictably has resulted in a
legal malpractice explosion. The public has come to expect and
demand greater performance from the profession. Gone is the
forgiveness of decades ago, where ignorance confessed by a lawyer
to a client would have been excuse enough. Now these clients are
asking and demanding that lawyers give a good account for their
time and their activities in behalf of their clients. Without a doubt,
the number of practitioners and the complexities encountered by
those practitioners in the legal profession, along with the increasing
sophistication of potential clientele, will produce an ever-increasing
body of legal malpractice law.
The profession, to grow, must accept the demands and
responsibilities demanded of the profession by the public. Not to do
so, will inevitably result in the destruction of the profession as we
now recognize it. The privilege to practice as an attorney should be
related to the responsibility of the practitioner. Responsibility, well
exercised and competently carried out, will inevitably result in
greater public respect. This should be the goal of all practicing
attorneys who have in mind the enhancement of the profession.

216. Sinton v. Foreman. 435 F.2d 962 (5(h Cir. 1970).
217. 247 Ark. 999. 448 S.A.2d 952 (1970).
218. McPhearson . Sullivan. 463 S.\\ .2d 174. 174-75 (Tex. 1971).
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